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Abstract
An increasing number of countries are passing laws that fa-
cilitate the mass surveillance of Internet traffic. In response,
governments and citizens are increasingly paying attention
to the countries that their Internet traffic traverses. In some
cases, countries are taking extreme steps, such as building
new Internet Exchange Points (IXPs), which allow networks
to interconnect directly, and encouraging local interconnec-
tion to keep local traffic local. We find that although many
of these efforts are extensive, they are often futile, due to the
inherent lack of hosting and route diversity for many popu-
lar sites. By measuring the country-level paths to popular
domains, we characterize transnational routing detours. We
find that traffic is traversing known surveillance states, even
when the traffic originates and ends in a country that does
not conduct mass surveillance. Then, we investigate how
clients can use overlay network relays and the open DNS
resolver infrastructure to prevent their traffic from traversing
certain jurisdictions. We find that 84% of paths originating
in Brazil traverse the United States, but when relays are used
for country avoidance, only 37% of Brazilian paths traverse
the United States. Using the open DNS resolver infrastruc-
ture allows Kenyan clients to avoid the United States on 17%
more paths. Unfortunately, we find that some of the more
prominent surveillance states (e.g., the U.S.) are also some of
the least avoidable countries.
1 Introduction
When Internet traffic enters a country, it becomes subject to
that country’s laws. As a result, users have more need than
ever to determine—and control—which countries their traffic
is traversing. An increasing number of countries have passed
laws that facilitate mass surveillance of their networks [24,
32, 35, 39], and governments and citizens are increasingly
motivated to divert their Internet traffic from countries that
perform surveillance (notably, the United States [17, 18, 48]).
Many countries—notably, Brazil—are taking impressive
measures to reduce the likelihood that Internet traffic tran-
sits the United States [9–11, 14, 30] including building a
3,500-mile long fiber-optic cable from Fortaleza to Portu-
gal (with no use of American vendors); pressing companies
such as Google, Facebook, and Twitter (among others) to
store data locally; and mandating the deployment of a state-
developed email system (Expresso) throughout the federal
government (instead of what was originally used, Microsoft
Outlook) [8, 12]. Brazil is also building Internet Exchange
Points (IXPs) [7], now has the largest national ecosystem of
public IXPs in the world [15], and the number of interna-
tionally connected Autonomous Systems (ASes) continues
to grow [13]. Brazil is not alone: IXPs are proliferating in
eastern Europe, Africa, and other regions, in part out of a
desire to “keep local traffic local”. Building IXPs alone, of
course, cannot guarantee that Internet traffic for some ser-
vice does not enter or transit a particular country: Internet
protocols have no notion of national borders, and interdo-
main paths depend in large part on existing interconnection
business relationships (or lack thereof).
Although end-to-end encryption stymies surveillance by
concealing URLs and content, it does not by itself protect all
sensitive information from prying eyes. First, many websites
do not fully support encrypted browsing by default; a recent
study showed that more than 85% of the most popular health,
news, and shopping sites do not encrypt by default [57]; mi-
grating a website to HTTPS is challenging doing so requires
all third-party domains on the site (including advertisers) to
use HTTPS. Second, even encrypted traffic may still reveal a
lot about user behavior: the presence of any communication
at all may be revealing, and website fingerprinting can reveal
information about content merely based on the size, con-
tent, and location of third-party resources that a client loads.
DNS traffic is also quite revealing and is essentially never
encrypted [57]. Third, ISPs often terminate TLS connections,
conducting man-in-the-middle attacks on encrypted traffic for
network management purposes [27]. Circumventing surveil-
lance thus requires not only encryption, but also mechanisms
for controlling where traffic goes in the first place.
In this paper, we study two questions: (1) Which coun-
tries do default Internet routing paths traverse?; (2) What
methods can help increase hosting and path diversity to help
governments and citizens better control transnational Internet
paths? In contrast to previous work [34], which simulates
Internet paths, we actively measure and analyze the paths
originating in five different countries: Brazil, Netherlands,
Kenya, India, and the United States. We study these countries
for different reasons, including their efforts made to avoid
certain countries, efforts in building out IXPs, and their low
cost of hosting domains. Our work studies the router-level
forwarding path, which differs from all other work in this
ar
X
iv
:1
60
5.
07
68
5v
1 
 [c
s.N
I] 
 24
 M
ay
 20
16
area, which has focused on analyzing Border Gateway Proto-
col (BGP) routes [34, 50]. Although BGP routing can offer
useful information about paths, it does not necessarily reflect
the path that traffic actually takes, and it only provides AS-
level granularity, which is often too coarse to make strong
statements about which countries that traffic is traversing. In
contrast, we measure traffic routes from RIPE Atlas probes in
five countries to the Alexa Top 100 domains for each country;
we directly measure the paths not only to the websites corre-
sponding to the themselves, but also to the sites hosting any
third-party content on each of these sites.
Determining which countries a client’s traffic traverses is
challenging, for several reasons. First, performing direct
measurements is more costly than passive analysis of BGP
routing tables; RIPE Atlas, in particular, limits the rate at
which one can perform measurements. As a result, we had
to be strategic about the origins and destinations that we se-
lected for our study. As we explain in Section 2, we study
five geographically diverse countries, focusing on countries in
each region that are making active attempts to thwart transna-
tional Internet paths. Second, IP geolocation—the process
of determining the geographic location of an IP address—is
notoriously challenging, particularly for IP addresses that rep-
resent Internet infrastructure, rather than end-hosts. We cope
with this inaccuracy by making conservative estimates of the
extent of routing detours, and by recognizing that our goal is
not to pinpoint a precise location for an IP address as much as
to achieve accurate reports of significant off-path detours to
certain countries or regions. (Section 3 explains our method
in more detail; we also explicitly highlight ambiguities in our
results.) Finally, the asymmetry of Internet paths can also
make it difficult to analyze the countries that traffic traverses
on the reverse path from server to client; our study finds that
country-level paths are often asymmetric, and, as such, our
findings represent a lower bound on transnational routing
detours.
The first part of our study (Section 3) characterizes the
current state of transnational Internet routing detours. We
first explore hosting diversity and find that only about half of
the Alexa Top 100 domains in the five countries studied are
hosted in more than one country, and many times that country
is a surveillance state that clients may want to avoid. Second,
even if hosting diversity can be improved, routing can still
force traffic through a small collection of countries (often
surveillance states). Despite strong efforts made by some
countries to ensure their traffic does not transit unfavorable
countries [9–11,14,30], their traffic still traverses surveillance
states. Over 50% of the top domains in Brazil and India
are hosted in the United States, and over 50% of the paths
from the Netherlands to the top domains transit the United
States. About half of Kenyan paths to the top domains traverse
the United States and Great Britain (but the same half does
not traverse both countries). Much of this phenomenon is
due to “tromboning”, whereby an Internet path starts and
ends in a country, yet transits an intermediate country; for
example, about 13% of the paths that we explored from Brazil
tromboned through the United States. Infrastructure building
alone is not enough: ISPs in respective regions need better
encouragements to interconnect with one another to ensure
that local traffic stays local.
The second part of our work (Section 4) explores potential
mechanisms for avoiding certain countries, and the potential
effectiveness of these techniques. We explore two techniques:
using the open DNS resolver infrastructure and using overlay
network relays. We find that both of these techniques can be
effective for clients in certain countries, yet the effectiveness
of each technique also depends on the county. For example,
Brazilian clients could completely avoid Spain, Italy, France,
Great Britain, Argentina, and Ireland (among others), even
though the default paths to many popular Brazilian sites tra-
verse these countries. Additionally, overlay network relays
can keep local traffic local: by using relays in the client’s
country, fewer paths trombone out of the client’s country. The
percentage of tromboning paths from the United States de-
creases from 11.2% to 1.3% when clients take advantage of a
small number of overlay network relays.
We also find that some of the most prominent surveillance
states are also some of the least avoidable countries. For
example, many countries depend on ISPs in the United States,
a known surveillance state, for connectivity to popular sites
and content. Brazil, India, Kenya, and the Netherlands must
traverse the United States to reach many of the popular local
websites, even if they use open resolvers and network relays.
Using overlay network relays, both Brazilian and Netherlands
clients can avoid the United States for about 65% of paths;
yet, the United States is completely unavoidable for about
10% of the paths because it is the only country where the
content is hosted. Kenyan clients can only avoid the United
States on about 55% of the paths. On the other hand, the
United States can avoid every other country except for France
and the Netherlands, and even then they are avoidable for
99% of the top domains.
2 State of Surveillance
We focused our study on five different countries, and for each,
we actively measured and analyzed traffic that originated
there. These five countries were chosen for specific reasons
and we present them here. We also discuss countries that cur-
rently conduct surveillance; this exploration is not exhaustive,
but highlights countries that are passing new surveillance laws
and countries that have strict surveillance practices already.
2.1 Studied Countries
We selected Brazil, Netherlands, Kenya, India, and the United
States for the following reasons.
Brazil. It has been widely publicized that Brazil is actively
trying to avoid having their traffic transit the United States.
They have been building IXPs, deploying underwater cables
to Europe, and pressuring large U.S. companies to host con-
tent within Brazil [7–12, 14, 30]. This effort to avoid traffic
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transitting a specific country led us to investigate whether
their efforts have been successful or not.
Netherlands. We selected to study the Netherlands for three
reasons: 1) the Netherlands is beginning to emerge as a site
where servers are located for cloud services, such as Akamai,
2) the Netherlands is where a large IXP is located (AMS-
IX), and 3) they are drafting a mass surveillance law [39].
Analyzing the Netherlands will allow us to see what effect
AMS-IX and the emergence of cloud service hosting has on
their traffic.
Kenya. Prior research on the interconnectivity of Africa [22,
28] led us to explore the characterization of an African coun-
try’s interconnectivity. We chose Kenya for a few reasons:
1) it is a location with many submarine cable landing points,
2) it has high Internet access and usage (for the East African
region), and 3) it has more than one IXP [1, 52].
India. India has one of the highest number of Internet users
in Asia, second only to China, which has already been well-
studied [53, 56]. With such a high number of Internet users,
and presumably a large amount of Internet traffic, we study
India to see where this traffic is going.
United States. We chose to study the United States because
of how inexpensive it is to host domains there, the preva-
lence of Internet and technology companies located there,
and because it is a known surveillance state.
2.2 Surveillance States
When analyzing which countries Internet traffic traverse, spe-
cial attention should be given to countries that may be unfavor-
able because of their surveillance laws. Some of the countries
that are currently conducting surveillance are the “Five Eyes”
[21, 36] (the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, New
Zealand, and Australia), as well as France, Germany, Poland,
Hungary, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Kaza-
khstan.
Five Eyes. The “Five Eyes” participants are the United States
National Security Agency (NSA), the United Kingdom’s Gov-
ernment Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Canada’s
Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC), the
Australian Signals Directorate (ASD), and New Zealand’s
Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) [21].
According to the original agreement, the agencies can: 1)
collect traffic; 2) acquire communications documents and
equipment; 3) conduct traffic analysis; 4) conduct cryptanal-
ysis; 5) decrypt and translate; 6) acquire information about
communications organizations, procedures, practices, and
equipment. The agreement also implies that all five countries
will share all intercepted material by default. The agencies
work so closely that the facilities are often jointly staffed
by members of the different agencies, and it was reported
“that SIGINT customers in both capitals seldom know which
country generated either the access or the product itself.” [36].
A number of other countries are passing laws to facilitate
mass surveillance. These laws have differing levels of in-
tensity, which can be seen in Table 1; the countries with the
Collecting
Metadata
(Phone,
Internet)
Requiring
ISPs to
Participate
No Need for
Court Order
Targeted
Surveillance
France [20, 23] [23]
Germany [26]
UA Emirates [25]
Bahrain [3]
Australia [21]
New Zealand [21]
Canada [21]
United States [21]
Great Britain [21]
Poland [20] [20]
Hungary [20] [20]
Ukraine [20] [42, 49]
Belarus [20] [42, 49]
Kyrgyzstan [20] [42, 49]
Kazakhstan [20] [42, 49]
Russia [20] [42, 49]
Table 1: Some countries that actively conduct surveillance.
least intense surveillance laws are listed at the top of the table,
and those with the more intense laws are listed at the bot-
tom. These countries, along with the “Five Eyes” participants
should be flagged when characterizing transnational detours
in the following section.
3 Characterizing Transnational Detours
In this section, we describe our measurement methods, the
challenges in conducting them, and our findings concerning
the transnational detours of default Internet paths.
3.1 Measurement Pipeline
Figure 2 summarizes our measurement process, which the
rest of this section describes in detail. We analyze traceroute
measurements to discover which countries are on the path
from a client in a particular country to a popular domain.
Using traceroutes to measure transnational detours is new;
prior work used BGP routing tables to infer country-level
paths [34]. Because we conduct active measurements, which
are limited by our resources, we make a tradeoff and study
five countries, as opposed to all countries’ Internet paths. We
report on measurements that we conducted on January 31,
2016.
3.1.1 Resource Limitations
The iPlane [37] and Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis
(CAIDA) [16] projects maintain two large repositories of
traceroute data, neither of which turn out to be suitable for
our study. iPlane measurements use PlanetLab [44] nodes and
has historical data as far back as 2006. Unfortunately, because
iPlane uses PlanetLab nodes, which mostly use the Global
Research and Education Network (GREN), the traceroutes
from PlanetLab nodes will not be representative of typical
Internet users’ traffic paths [5]. CAIDA runs traceroutes
from different vantage points around the world to randomized
destination IP addresses that cover all /24s; in contrast, we
focus on paths to popular websites from a particular country.
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1.Connect to 
VPNs and curl
2.Extract 
3rd party domains
VPNs3.Send DNS q ue rie s RIPE Atlas Traceroutes 6.Collect responses4.Collect responsesIN USKE Domains & Subdomains NL 5.Traceroutes to all IPsDomain:IPsSubdomains:IPs Alexa top 100 domainsBR Figure 1: Measurement pipeline to study Internet paths from countries to popular domains.In contrast to these existing studies, we run active measure-ments that would represent paths of a typical Internet user. Todo so, we run DNS and traceroute measurements from RIPEAtlas probes, which are hosted all around the world and inmany different settings, including home networks [46]. RIPEAtlas probes can use the local DNS resolver, which wouldgive us the best estimate of the traceroute destination.Yet, conducting measurements from a RIPE Atlas probecosts a certain amount of “credits”, which restricts the numberof measurements that we could run. RIPE Atlas also imposesrate limits on the number of concurrent measurements and thenumber of credits that an individual user can spend per day.
We address these challenges in two ways: (1) we reduce the
number of necessary measurements we must run on RIPE At-
las probes by conducting traceroute measurements to a single
IP address in each /24 (as opposed to all IP address returned
by DNS) because all IP addresses in a /24 belong to the same
AS, and should therefore be located in the same geographic
area; (2) we use a different method—VPN connections—to
obtain a vantage point within a foreign country, which is still
representative of an Internet user in that country.
3.1.2 Path Asymmetry
The reverse path is just as important as (and often different
from) the forward path. Previous work has shown that paths
are not symmetric most of the time—the forward path from
point A to point B does not match the reverse path from
point B to point A [29]. Most work on path asymmetry has
been done at the AS level, but not at the country level. Our
measurements consider only the forward path (from client
to domain or relay), not the reverse path from the domain or
relay to the client.
We measured path asymmetry at the country granularity.
If country-level paths are symmetric, then the results of our
measurements would be representative of the forward and
reverse paths. If the country-level paths are asymmetric, then
our measurement results only provide a lower bound on the
number of countries that could potentially conduct surveil-
lance. Using 100 RIPE Atlas probes located around the world,
and eight Amazon EC2 instances, we ran traceroute measure-
ments from every probe to every EC2 instance and from every
EC2 instance to every probe. After mapping the IPs to coun-
tries, we analyzed the paths for symmetry. First, we compared
the set of countries on the forward path to the set of countries
on the reverse path; this yielded about 30% symmetry. What
Traceroutes of 
BR,NL,KE,IN,US
Traceroute to 104.28...
1. 176.6...
2. 149.6….
3. 154.25….
4. 130.117...
5. 154.25….
6. *
7. 104.28...
Country 
Mapping
Remove 
Unknown hops
Country Level Path
  FR-GR-US
  ….
IP to country
1. FR
2. GR
3. US
4. None
5. US
6. None
7.US
Country level 
path
Figure 2: Mapping country-level paths from traceroutes.
we wanted to know is whether or not the reverse path has
more countries on it than the forward path. Thus, we mea-
sured how many reverse paths were a subset of the respective
forward path; this was the case for 55% of the paths. This
level of asymmetry suggests that our results represent a lower
bound on the number of countries that transit traffic; our re-
sults are a lower bound on how many unfavorable countries
transit a client’s path. It also suggests that while providing
lower bounds on transnational detours is feasible, designing
systems to completely prevent these detours on both forward
and reverse paths may be particularly challenging, if not im-
possible.
3.1.3 Traceroute Origination and Destination Selection
Each country hosts a different number of RIPE Atlas probes,
ranging from about 75 probes to many hundreds. Because
of the resource restrictions, we could not use all probes in
each of the countries. We selected the set of probes that had
unique ASes in the country to get the widest representation
of origination (starting) points.
For destinations, we used the Alexa Top 100 domains in
each of the respective countries, as well as the third-party do-
mains that are requested as part of an original web request. To
obtain these 3rd party domains we curl (i.e., HTTP fetch)
each of the Top 100 domains, but we must do so from within
the country we are studying. There is no current functionality
to curl from RIPE Atlas probes, so we establish a VPN
connection within each of these countries to curl each do-
main and extract the third-party domains; we curl from the
client’s location in case web sites are customizing content
based on the region of the client.
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Brazil .169 - - - -
Canada .001 .007 .015 .006 -
United States .774 .454 .629 .443 .969
France .001 .022 .009 .023 .001
Germany .002 .013 .014 .028 .001
Great Britain - .019 .021 .032 .002
Ireland .016 .064 .027 .108 .001
Netherlands .013 .392 .101 .200 .024
Spain .001 - - - -
Kenya - - - .022 -
Mauritius - - - .004 -
South Africa - - - .021 -
United Arab Emirates - - - .011 -
India - - .053 .002 -
Singapore - .002 .103 .027 -
Table 2: Fraction of paths that terminate in each country by default.
3.1.4 Country Mapping
Accurate IP geolocation is challenging. We use MaxMind’s
geolocation service to map IP addresses to their respective
countries [38], which is known to contain inaccuracies. Fortu-
nately, our study does not require high-precision geolocation;
we are more interested in providing accurate lower bounds on
detours at a much coarser granularity. Fortunately, previous
work has found that geolocation at a country-level granularity
is more accurate than at finer granularity [31]. In light of
these concerns, we post-processed our IP to country map-
ping by removing all IP addresses that resulted in a ‘None’
response when querying MaxMind, which causes our results
to provide a conservative estimate of the number of coun-
tries that paths traverse. It is important to note that removing
‘None’ responses will always produce a conservative estimate,
and therefore we are always underestimating the amount of
potential surveillance. Figure 2 shows an example of this
post-processing.
3.2 Results
Table 2 shows the five countries we studied along the top of
the table, and the countries that host their content along in
each row. For example, the United States is the endpoint of
77% of the paths that originate in Brazil. A “-” represents the
case where no paths ended in that country. For example, no
Brazilian paths terminated in South Africa. Table 3 shows the
fraction of paths that transit certain countries, with a row for
each country that is transited.
Finding 3.1 (Hosting Diversity): About half of the top do-
mains in each of the five countries studied are hosted in a
single country. The other half are located in two or more
different countries.
First we analyze hosting diversity; this shows us how many
unique countries host a domain. The more countries that a
domain is hosted in creates a greater chance that the content is
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Brazil 1.00 - - - -
Canada .013 .007 .016 .008 .081
United States .844 .583 .715 .616 1.00
France .059 .102 .104 .221 .104
Germany .005 .050 .032 .048 .008
Great Britain .024 .140 .204 .500 .006
Ireland .028 .106 .031 .133 .006
Netherlands .019 1.00 .121 .253 .031
Spain .176 .004 - - -
Kenya - - - 1.00 -
Mauritius - - - .322 -
South Africa - - - .334 -
United Arab Emirates - - - .152 -
India - - 1.00 .058 -
Singapore - .002 .270 .040 .003
Table 3: Fraction of paths that each country transits by default.
Figure 3: The locations of vantage points in measuring hosting
diversity.
replicated in a favorable country, and could potentially allow
a client to circumvent an unfavorable country. We queried
DNS from 26 vantage points around the world, which are
shown in Figure 3; we chose this set of locations because
they are geographically diverse. Then we mapped the IP
addresses in the DNS responses to their respective countries
to determine how many unique countries a domain is hosted
in. Figure 4 shows the fraction of domains that are hosted
in different numbers of countries; we can see two common
hosting cases: 1) CDNs, and 2) a single hosting country.
This shows that many domains are hosted in a single unique
country, which leads us to our next analysis—where are these
domains hosted, and which countries are traversed on the way
to reach these locations.
Finding 3.2 (Domain Hosting): The most common destina-
tion among all five countries studied is the United States:
77%, 45%, 63%, 44%, and 97% of paths originating in Brazil,
Netherlands, India, Kenya and the United States, respectively,
are currently reaching content located in the United States.
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(a) The Netherlands.
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(b) Brazil.
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(c) Kenya.
Figure 5: The countries that tromboning paths from the Netherlands, Brazil, and Kenya transit.
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Figure 4: The number of Alexa Top 100 US Domains hosted in
different countries.
Table 2 shows the fraction of paths that are hosted in various
countries. Despite the extent of country-level hosting diver-
sity, the majority of paths from all five countries terminate in a
single country: the United States, a known surveillance state.
Our results also show the Netherlands is a common hosting
location for paths originating in the Netherlands, India, and
Kenya.
Finding 3.3 (Domestic Traffic): All of the countries studied
(except for the United States) host content for a small per-
centage of the paths that originate in their own country; they
also host a small percentage of their respective country-code
top-level domains.
Only 17% of paths that originate in Brazil also end there.
Only 5% and 2% of Indian and Kenyan paths, respectively,
end in the originating country. For Kenya, 24 out of the Top
100 Domains are .ke domains, and of these 24 domains only 5
are hosted within Kenya. 29 out of 40 .nl domains are hosted
in the Netherlands; 4 of 13 .in domains are hosted in India;
18 of 39 .br domains are hosted in Brazil. Interestingly, all
.gov domains were hosted in their respective country.
Finding 3.4 (Transit Traffic): Surveillance states (specifi-
cally the United States and Great Britain) are on the largest
portion of paths in comparison to any other (foreign) country.
84% of Brazilian paths traverse the United States, despite
Brazil’s strong efforts to avoid United States surveillance.
Although India and Kenya are geographically distant, 72%
and 62% of their paths also transit the United States.
Great Britain and the Netherlands are on the path for a sig-
nificant percentage of paths originating in India and Kenya:
50% and 20% of paths that originate in Kenya and India, re-
spectively, transit Great Britain. Many paths likely traverse
Great Britain and the Netherlands due to the presence of large
Internet Exchange Points (i.e., LINX, AMS-IX). Mauritius,
South Africa, and the United Arab Emirates transit 32%, 33%,
and 15% of paths from Kenya. There are direct underwater
cables from Kenya to Mauritius, and from Mauritius to South
Africa [51]. Additionally, there is a cable from Mombasa,
Kenya to Fujairah, United Arab Emirates, which likely ex-
plains the large fraction of paths that include these countries.
Finding 3.5 (Tromboning Traffic): Brazilian and Nether-
lands paths often trombone to the United States, despite the
prevalence of IXPs in both countries.
Figures 5a, 5b, and 5c show the fraction of paths that trom-
bone to different countries for the Netherlands, Brazil, and
Kenya. 24% of all paths originating in the Netherlands (62%
of domestic paths) trombone to a foreign country before re-
turning to the Netherlands. Despite Brazil’s strong efforts in
building IXPs to keep local traffic local, we can see that their
paths still trombone to the United States. This is due to IXPs
being seen as a threat by competing commercial providers;
providers are sometimes concerned that “interconnection”
will result in making business cheaper for competitors and
stealing of customers [45]. It is likely that Brazilian providers
see other Brazilian providers as competitors and therefore as
a threat at IXPs, which cause them to peer with international
providers instead of other local providers. Additionally, we
see Brazilian paths trombone to Spain and Italy. We have
observed that MaxMind sometimes mislabels IP addresses to
be in Spain when they are actually located in Portugal. This
mislabelling does not affect our analysis of detours through
surveillance states, as we do not highlight either Spain or Por-
tugal as a surveillance state. We see Italy often in tromboning
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paths because Telecom Italia Sparkle is one of the top global
Internet providers [4].
Tromboning Kenyan paths most commonly traverse Mau-
ritius, which is expected considering the submarine cables
between Kenya and Mauritius. Submarine cables also explain
South Africa, Tanzania, and the United Arab Emirates on
tromboning paths.
Finding 3.6 (United States as an Outlier): The United States
hosts 97% of the content that is accessed from within the
country, and only five foreign countries—France, Germany,
Ireland, Great Britain, and the Netherlands—host content for
the other 3% of paths.
Many of the results find that Brazilian, Netherlands, Indian,
and Kenyan paths often transit surveillance states, most no-
tably the United States. The results from studying paths that
originate in the United States are drastically different from
those of the other four countries. The other four countries
host very small amounts of content accessed from their own
country, whereas the United States hosts 97% of the content
that is accessed from within the country. Only 13 unique
countries are ever on a path from the United States to a do-
main in the top 100 (or third party domain), whereas 30, 30,
25, and 38 unique countries are seen on the paths originating
in Brazil, Netherlands, India, and Kenya, respectively.
3.3 Limitations
This section discusses the various limitations of our measure-
ment methods and how they may affect the results that we
have reported.
Traceroute accuracy and completeness. Our study is lim-
ited by the accuracy and completeness of traceroute. Anoma-
lies can occur in traceroute-based measurements [2], but
most traceroute anomalies do not cause an overestimation
in surveillance states. The incompleteness of traceroutes,
where a router does not respond, causes our results to under-
estimate the number of surveillance states, and therefore also
provides a lower bound on surveillance.
IP Geolocation vs. country mapping. Previous work has
shown that there are fundamental challenges in deducing a
geographic location from an IP address, despite using differ-
ent methods such as DNS names of the target, network delay
measurements, and host-to-location mapping in conjunction
with BGP prefix information [43]. While it has been shown
that there are inaccuracies and incompleteness in MaxMind’s
data [31], the focus of this work is on measuring and avoid-
ing surveillance. We use Maxmind to map IP to country (as
described in Section 3.1.4), which provides a lower bound on
the amount of surveillance, as we have described.
IPv4 vs. IPv6 connectivity. The measurements we con-
ducted only collect and analyze IPv4 paths, and therefore
all IPv6 paths are left out of our study. IPv6 paths likely
differ from IPv4 paths as not all routers that support IPv4
also support IPv6. Future work includes studying IPv6 paths
and which countries they transit, as well as a comparison of
country avoidability between IPv4 and IPv6 paths.
Open DNS resolvers
Traceroutes 
Domains & 
Subdomains 
1.Send
DNS queries
2.Collect 
responses
Domain:IPs
Subdomains:IPs
VPNs
3.Connect 
to VPNs
4.Traceroute 
to all IPs
5.Collect 
responses
Figure 6: Measurement approach for country avoidance with open
DNS resolvers.
4 Preventing Transnational Detours
In light of our analysis of the state of default Internet paths
from Section 3, we now explore the extent to which various
techniques and systems can help clients in various countries
prevent unwanted transnational routing detours. We explore
two different mechanisms for increasing path diversity: dis-
covering additional website replicas by diverting DNS queries
through global open DNS resolvers and creating additional
network-layer paths with the use of overlay nodes. We dis-
cuss our measurement methods, develop an avoidance metric
and algorithm, and present our results.
4.1 Measurement Approach
Country Avoidance with Open Resolvers. If content is
replicated on servers in different parts of the world, open
DNS resolvers located around the world may also help clients
discover a more diverse set of replicas.
Figure 6 illustrates our measurement approach for this
study, which differs slightly from that described in Section
3.1: instead of using RIPE Atlas probes to query local DNS
resolvers, we query open DNS resolvers located around the
world [33]. These open DNS resolvers may provide different
IP addresses in the DNS responses, which represent different
locations of content replicas. The measurement study in
Section 3.1 used RIPE Atlas probes to traceroute to the IP
addresses in DNS response; in contrast, for this portion of the
study we initiate a VPN connection to the client’s country and
traceroute (through the VPN connection) to the IP addresses
in the DNS responses returned by the open resolvers.
Country Avoidance with Relays. Using an overlay network
may help clients route around unfavorable countries or access
content that is hosted in a different country. Figure 7 shows
the steps to conduct this measurement. After selecting relay
machines, we run traceroute measurements from Country X
to each relay and from each relay to the set of domains. We
then analyze these traceroutes using the pipeline in Figure 2
to determine country-level paths.
We use eight Amazon EC2 instances, one in each geo-
graphic region (United States, Ireland, Germany, Singapore,
South Korea, Japan, Australia, Brazil), as well as 4 Virtual
Private Server (VPS) machines (France, Spain, Brazil, Sin-
gapore), which are virtual machines that are functionally
equivalent to dedicated physical servers. The conjunction of
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Figure 7: Measurement approach for country avoidance with over-
lay network relays.
these two sets of machines allow us to evaluate surveillance
avoidance with a geographically diverse set of relays. By se-
lecting an open resolver in each country that also has a relay
in it we can keep the variation in measurement methods low,
leading to a more accurate comparison of country avoidance
methods.
4.2 Avoidability Metrics
We introduce a new metric and algorithm to measure how
often a client in Country X can avoid a specific country Y.
Using the proposed metric and algorithm, we can compare
how well the different methods achieve country avoidance for
any (X, Y) pair.
Avoidability metric. We introduce an avoidability metric
to quantify how often traffic can avoid Country Y when it
originates in Country X. Avoidability is the fraction of paths
that start in Country X and do not transit Country Y. We
calculate this value by dividing the number of paths from
Country X to domains that do not traverse Country Y by
the total number of paths from Country X. The resulting
value will be in the range [0,1], where 0 means the country
is unavoidable for all of the domains in our study, and 1
means the client can avoid Country Y for all domains in our
study. For example, there are three paths originating in Brazil:
(1) BR→US, (2) BR→CO→ None, 3) BR→ ∗∗∗ → BR.
After processing the paths as described in Section 3.1.4, the
resulting paths are: (1) BR→US, (2) BR→CO, (3) BR→
BR. The avoidance value for avoiding the United States would
be 2/3 because two out of the three paths do not traverse the
United States. This metric represents a lower bound, because
it is possible that the third path timed out (∗ ∗ ∗) because it
traversed the United States, which would make the third path:
BR→US→ BR, and would cause the avoidance metric to
drop to 1/3.
Avoidability algorithm with open resolvers. Recall from
the measurement pipeline for avoidance with open resolvers,
described in Section 4.1, that the resulting data are traceroutes
from the client in Country X to all IP addresses in all open
DNS resolver responses. To measure avoidability, there must
exist at least one path from the client in Country X to the
domain for the client to be able to avoid Country Y when
accessing the domain. The country avoidance value is the
Algorithm 1 Avoidability Algorithm
1: function CALCAVOIDANCE(set paths1, set paths2, string c)
2: set usableRelays
3: for each (relay, path) in paths1 do
4: if c not in path then
5: usableRelays← path
6: set accessibleDomains
7: for each (relay,domain, path in paths2 do
8: if relay in usableRelays then
9: if c not in path then
10: accessibleDomains← domain
11: D← number of all unique domains in paths2
12: A← length of accessibleDomains
13: return A/D
fraction of domains accessible from the client in Country X
without traversing Country Y.
Avoidability algorithm with relays. Measuring the avoid-
ability of a Country Y from a client in Country X using relays
has two components: (1) Is Country Y on the path from the
client in Country X to the relay? (2) Is Country Y on the
path from the relay to the domain? For every domain, our
algorithm checks if there exists at least one path from the
client in Country X through any relay and on to the domain,
and does not transit Country Y. The algorithm (Algorithm 1)
produces a value in the range [0,1] that can be compared to
the output of the avoidability metric described above.
Upper bound on avoidability. Although the avoidability
metric and algorithm provide a method to quantify how avoid-
able Country Y is from a client in Country X, it may be the
case that a number of domains are only hosted in Country
Y, so the avoidance value for these countries would never
reach 1.0. For this reason, we measured the upper bound on
avoidance for a given pair of (Country X, Country Y) that
represents the best case value for avoidance. Algorithm 2
shows the pseudocode for computing this metric. The algo-
rithm analyzes the destinations of all domains from all relays
and if there exists at least one destination for a domain that is
not in Country Y, then this increases the upper bound value.
An upper bound value of 1.0 means that every domain studied
is hosted (or has a replica) outside of Country Y. This value
puts the avoidance values in perspective for each (Country X,
Country Y) pair.
4.3 Results
We compared avoidance values when using open resolvers,
when using relays, and when using no country avoidance
tool. First, we discuss how effective open resolvers are at
country avoidance. We then examine the effectiveness of
relays for country avoidance, as well as for keeping local
traffic local. Table 4 shows avoidance values; the top row
shows the countries we studied and the left column shows the
country that the client aims to avoid.
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Country to Avoid Brazil Netherlands India Kenya United States
Brazil 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Canada .98 1.00 1.00 .99 1.00 1.00 .98 .98 .98 .99 .99 .99 .92 1.00 1.00
United States .15 .19 .62 .41 .57 .63 .28 .45 .65 .38 .55 .40 0.00 0.00 0.00
France .94 .98 1.00 .89 .96 .99 .89 .98 1.00 .77 .89 .98 .89 .99 .99
Germany .99 .99 1.00 .95 .98 .99 .96 .97 .99 .95 .99 1.00 .99 .99 1.00
Great Britain .97 .97 1.00 .86 .87 .99 .79 .79 1.00 .50 .71 .97 .99 .99 1.00
Ireland .97 .98 .99 .89 .97 .99 .96 .99 .99 .86 .98 .99 .99 .99 .99
Netherlands .98 .98 .99 0.00 0.00 0.00 .87 .98 .99 .74 .98 .99 .97 .99 .99
Spain .82 1.00 1.00 .99 .99 .99 1.00 .99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Kenya 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Mauritius 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 .67 .97 .99 1.00 1.00 1.00
South Africa 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 .66 .87 .66 1.00 1.00 1.00
United Arab Emirates 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 .84 1.00 .99 1.00 1.00 1.00
India 1.00 1.00 1.00 .99 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 .94 .94 1.00 .99 1.00 1.00
Singapore .99 .99 1.00 .99 .99 1.00 .73 .92 .94 .96 .96 1.00 .99 .99 1.00
Table 4: Avoidance values for different techniques of country avoidance. The upper bound on avoidance is 1.0 in most cases, but not all. It
is common for some European countries to host a domain, and therefore the upper bound is slightly lower than 1.0. The upper bound on
avoidance of the United States is significantly lower than the upper bound on avoidance for any other country; .886, .790, .844, and .765 are
the upper bounds on avoidance of the United States for paths originating in Brazil, Netherlands, India, and Kenya, respectively.
Algorithm 2 Avoidance Upper Bound Algorithm
1: function CALCUPPERBOUND(set relayDomainPaths, string c)
2: zeros(domainLocations)
3: for each (r,d, p) in relayDomainPaths do
4: dest← last item in p
5: domainLocations[d]← dest
6: set accessibleDomains
7: for each domain in domainLocations do
8: if domainLocations[domain] 6= set[c] then
9: accessibleDomains← domain
10: D← all unique domains in relayDomainPaths
11: A← length of accessibleDomains
12: return A/D
4.3.1 Avoidance with Open Resolvers
A given country is more avoidable (higher avoidance value)
when open resolvers are used as a tool for country avoidance.
Finding 4.1 (Open Resolver Effectiveness): Using open
DNS resolvers for country avoidance achieves more coun-
try avoidance than using local resolvers and less (or equal)
avoidance than using relays for clients in most countries.
For Brazilian paths, open resolvers only achieve 4% more
avoidance than using local resolvers when avoiding the United
States, whereas relays achieve 47% more avoidance. On the
other hand, open resolvers are about as effective as relays are
for avoidance for paths originating in the United States.
Finding 4.2 (Kenya as an Outlier): For clients in Kenya,
open DNS resolvers are significantly more effective than re-
lays for avoiding the United States, South Africa, and the
United Arab Emirates.
Clients in Kenya should use open DNS resolvers when avoid-
ing specific countries, as they can avoid these specific coun-
tries more often than when using relays. Kenyan clients can
avoid the United States for 55% of paths when using open
resolvers, whereas they can only avoid the United States for
40% of paths when using relays. The difference in how often
the United States can be avoided can be attributed to the lower
amount of DNS diversity when using relays as compared to
using open resolvers. For a client in Kenya trying to avoid
the United States, the client can only use the relay located in
Ireland (because all paths from the client to the other relays
traverse the United States), and therefore only gets DNS re-
sponses from locally resolving domains on the Ireland relay.
When using open resolvers, the client gets more DNS diver-
sity as he gets DNS responses from all open resolvers located
in different countries.
The amount of avoidance Kenyan clients can achieve for
avoiding South Africa is the same, regardless of whether the
client is using relays, because all paths between the client
and the relays traverse South Africa. Fortunately, clients can
avoid South Africa for significantly more paths when using
open resolvers, likely as a result of the fact that open DNS
resolvers can better uncover hosting diversity.
4.3.2 Avoidance with Relays
As seen in Table 4, there are two significant trends: 1) the
ability for a client to avoid a given Country Y increases with
the use of relays, and 2) the least avoidable countries are
surveillance states.
Finding 4.3 (Relay Effectiveness): For 84% of the (Country
X, Country Y) pairs shown in Table 4 the avoidance with
relays reaches the upper bound on avoidance.
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In almost every (Country X, Country Y) pair, where Country
X is the client’s country (Brazil, Netherlands, India, Kenya, or
the United States) and Country Y is the country to avoid, the
use of an overlay network makes Country Y more avoidable
than the default routes. The one exception we encountered is
when a client is located in Kenya and wants to avoid South
Africa, where, as mentioned, all paths through our relays exit
Kenya via South Africa.
Finding 4.4 (Relays Achieve Upper Bound): Clients in the
United States can achieve the upper bound of avoidance for
all countries—relays help clients in this country avoid all
other Country Y in all cases that the domain is not hosted in
Country Y.
Relays are most effective for clients in the United States. On
the other hand, it is much rarer for (Kenya, Country Y) pairs
to achieve the upper bound of surveillance, showing that it
is more difficult for Kenyan clients to avoid a given country.
This is not to say that relays are not effective for clients in
Kenya; for example, the default routes to the top 100 domains
for Kenyans avoid Great Britain 50% of the time, but with
relays this percentage increases to about 97% of the time, and
the upper bound is about 98%.
Finding 4.5 (Surveillance States are Less Avoidable): The
ability for any country to avoid the United States is signifi-
cantly lower than it’s ability to avoid any other country in
all four situations: without relays, with open resolvers, with
relays, and the upper bound.
Despite increasing clients’ ability to avoid the United States,
relays are not as effective at helping clients avoid this country
as compared to the effectiveness of the relays at avoiding all
other Country Y. Clients in India can avoid the United States
more often than clients in Brazil, Netherlands, and Kenya, by
avoiding the United States for 65% of paths. Kenyan clients
can only avoid the United States 40% of the time even while
using relays. Additionally, the upper bound for avoiding the
United States is significantly lower in comparison to any other
country.
Finding 4.6 (Keeping Local Traffic Local): Using relays
decreased both the number of tromboning paths, and the
number of countries involved in tromboning paths.
For the cases where there were relays located in one of the
five studied countries, we evaluated how effectively the use
of relays kept local traffic local. This evaluation was possible
for Brazil and the United States. Tromboning Brazilian paths
decreased from 13.2% without relays to 9.7% with relays;
when relays are used, all tromboning paths goes only to the
United States. With the use of relays, there was only 1.3%
tromboning paths for a United States client, whereas without
relays there was 11.2% tromboning paths. For the 1.2% of
paths that trombones from the United States, it goes only to
Ireland.
5 Discussion
Avoiding multiple countries. We have studied only the ex-
tent to which Internet paths can be engineered to avoid a
single country. Yet, avoiding a single country may force
an Internet path into other unfavorable jurisdictions. This
possibility suggests that we should also be exploring the feasi-
bility of avoiding multiple surveillance states (e.g., the “Five
Eyes”) or perhaps even entire regions. It is already clear that
avoiding certain combinations of countries is not possible, at
least given the current set of relays; for example, to avoid the
US, Kenyan clients rely on the relay located in Ireland, so
avoiding both countries is often impossible.
The evolution of routing detours and avoidance over time.
Our study is based on a snapshot of Internet paths. Over
time, paths change, hosting locations change, IXPs are built,
submarine cables are laid, and surveillance states change.
Future work can and should involve exploring how these paths
evolve over time, and analyzing the relative effectiveness of
different strategies for controlling traffic flows.
Isolating DNS diversity vs. path diversity. In our exper-
iments, the overlay network relays perform DNS lookups
from geographically diverse locations, which provides some
level of DNS diversity in addition to the path diversity that
the relays inherently provide. This approach somewhat con-
flates the benefits of DNS diversity with the benefits of path
diversity and in practice may increase clients’ vulnerability
to surveillance, since each relay is performing DNS lookups
on each client’s behalf. We plan to conduct additional experi-
ments where the client relies on its local DNS resolver to map
domains to IP addresses, as opposed to relying on the relays
for both DNS resolution and routing diversity.
6 Related Work
Nation-state routing analysis. Recently, Shah and Pa-
padopoulos measured international BGP detours (paths that
originate in one country, cross international borders, and then
return to the original country) [50]. Using BGP routing tables,
they found 2 million detours in each month of their study
(out of 7 billion total paths), and they then characterized the
detours based on detour dynamics and persistence. Our work
differs by actively measuring traceroutes (actual paths), as
opposed to analyzing BGP routes. This difference is fun-
damental as BGP provides the AS path announced in BGP
update messages, which is not necessarily the same as the
actual path of data packets. Obar and Clement analyzed tracer-
outes that started and ended in Canada, but “boomeranged”
through the United States (“boomerang” is another term for
tromboning), and argued that this is a violation of Canadian
network sovereignty [41]. Most closely related to our work,
Karlin et al. developed a framework for country-level routing
analysis to study how much influence each country has over
interdomain routing [34]. This work measures the centrality
of a country to routing and uses AS-path inference to measure
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and quantify country centrality, whereas our work uses active
measurements and measures avoidability of a given country.
Mapping national Internet topologies. In 2011, Roberts
et al. described a method for mapping national networks of
ASes, identifying ASes that act as points of control in the
national network, and measuring the complexity of the na-
tional network [47]. There have also been a number of studies
that measured and classified the network within a country.
Wahlisch et al. measured and classified the ASes on the Ger-
man Internet [54, 55], Zhou et al. measured the complete
Chinese Internet topology at the AS level [58], and Bischof
et al. characterized the current state of Cuba’s connectivity
with the rest of the world [6]. Interconnectivity has also been
studied at the continent level; Gupta et al. first looked at ISP
interconnectivity within Africa [28], and it was studied later
by Fanou et al. [22].
Circumvention Systems. There has been research into cir-
cumvention systems, particularly for censorship circumven-
tion, that is related this work, but not sufficient for surveil-
lance circumvention. Tor is an anonymity system that uses
three relays and layered encryption to allow users to commu-
nicate anonymously [19]. VPNGate is a public VPN relay
system aimed at circumventing national firewalls [40]. Un-
fortunately, VPNGate does not allow a client to choose any
available VPN, which makes surveillance avoidance harder.
7 Conclusion
We have measured Internet paths to characterize routing de-
tours that take Internet paths through countries that perform
surveillance. Our findings show that paths commonly tra-
verse known surveillance states, even when they originate
and end in a non-surveillance state. As a possible step to-
wards a remedy, we have investigated how clients can use the
open DNS resolver infrastructure and overlay network relays
to prevent routing detours through unfavorable jurisdictions.
These methods give clients the power to avoid certain coun-
tries, as well as help keep local traffic local. Although some
countries are completely avoidable, we find that some of the
more prominent surveillance states are the least avoidable.
Our study presents several opportunities for follow-up stud-
ies and future work. First, Internet paths continually evolve;
we will repeat this analysis over time and publish the results
and data on a public website, to help deepen our collective un-
derstanding about how the evolution of Internet connectivity
affects transnational routes. Second, our analysis should be
extended to study the extent to which citizens in one country
can avoid groups of countries or even entire regions. Finally,
although our results provide strong evidence for the existence
of various transnational data flows, factors such as uncertain
IP geolocation make it difficult to provide clients guaran-
tees about country-level avoidance; developing techniques
and systems that offer clients stronger guarantees is a ripe
opportunity for future work.
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